The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences by Johansen, Stian Øby
  
Special Section: Opinion 2/13 
 
The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and 
Its Potential Consequences 
 
By Stian Øby Johansen* 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
On 18 December 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
1
 delivered 
Opinion 2/13
2
 and stunned the legal world by declaring that the Draft Agreement on the 
Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Accession 
Agreement)
3
 was incompatible with the constituent treaties of the Union. Although some 
experts, admittedly, had been skeptical about certain aspects of Draft Accession 
Agreement,
4
 no one seems to have expected an opinion so critical and uncompromising. 
The opinion has consequently received widespread disapproval in the EU legal 
blogosphere.
5
 
 
                                            
* PhD fellow at Centre for European Law, University of Oslo. Thanks to Professors Fredrik Sejersted and Alla 
Pozdnakova, and the research assistants at the Centre for European Law for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 References to the CJEU in the following also refer, where appropriate, to its predecessor, the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities. 
2 Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, CJEU Case C-2/13 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/ [hereinafter 
Opinion 2/13]. 
3 Council of Europe, Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
FIFTH NEGOTIATION MEETING BETWEEN THE CDDH AD HOC NEGOTIATION GROUP & THE EUR. COMM’N ON THE ACCESSION OF THE 
EUR. UNION TO THE EUR. CONV. ON H.R. app. 1 (2013). 
4 See Tobias Lock, Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal 
Order, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1025 (2011). 
5 See, e.g., Tobias Lock, Oops! We Did it Again – the CJEU’s Opinion on EU Accession to the ECHR, VERFASSUNGSBLOG 
(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/oops-das-gutachten-des-eugh-zum-emrk-beitritt-der-eu/; 
Walther Michl, Thou Shalt Have No Other Courts Before Me, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/thou-shalt-no-courts/; Stian Øby Johansen, Opinion 2/13: A Bag of Coal From 
the CJEU, ØBY-KANALEN (Jan. 10, 2015), https://obykanalen.wordpress.com/2015/01/10/opinion-213-a-bag-of-
coal-from-the-cjeu/; Aidan O’Neill, Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: The CJEU as Humpty Dumpty, 
EUTOPIALAW (Dec. 18, 2014), http://eutopialaw.com/2014/12/18/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-the-echr-the-
cjeu-as-humpty-dumpty/; Steve Peers, The CJEU and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: A Clear and Present Danger 
to Human Rights Protection, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.no/2014/12/the-cjeu-
and-eus-accession-to-echr.html. 
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While there are many threads in Opinion 2/13 that deserve critical analysis,
6
 I will focus 
here only on one: The CJEU’s interpretation and application of Article 344 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)—one of the five separate grounds given for 
rejecting the Accession Agreement.
7
 Specifically, I will compare the approach taken in 
Opinion 2/13 with the approach of the CJEU in earlier case-law. I will argue that the 
reasoning and conclusion concerning TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 is clearly at odds 
with this earlier case law, notably the leading MOX Plant case.
8
 I will also demonstrate how 
the approach to the issue in Opinion 2/13—if it indeed reflects lex lata—seriously affects 
numerous treaties that the Union has already concluded. 
 
B. TFEU Article 344 and Its Relevance for the EU’s Accession to the ECHR 
 
Although the Union has an obligation to accede to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)
9
 under Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
10
 this obligation is 
not unconditional. Article 3 of Protocol (No. 8) to the constituent treaties of the Union,
11
 
which relates to TEU article 6(2), provides that “[n]othing in the [Accession Agreement] 
shall affect [TFEU] Article 344.”
12
 According to TFEU Article 344, “Member States 
undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for [in the Treaties].”
13
 
This provision entails a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CJEU in inter-party cases that 
involve Union law. TFEU Article 344 may furthermore be understood as a specific 
expression of the member states’ duty of loyalty under TEU Article 4(3).
14
 More generally, 
                                            
6 As evidenced by the many and diverse contributions concerning Opinion 2/13 in this issue of the German Law 
Journal. 
7 The other four reasons being that (1) the Accession Agreement is liable adversely to affect the specific 
characteristics and the autonomy of EU law, (2) the Accession Agreement does not lay down arrangements for 
the operation of the co-respondent mechanism that enable the specific characteristics of Union law to be 
preserved, (3) the Accession Agreement does not lay down arrangements for the prior involvement of the CJEU 
that enable the specific characteristics of Union law to be preserved, and (4) the Accession Agreement fails to 
have regard to the specific characteristics of Union law with regard to the judicial review of conduct on part of the 
EU under in Common Foreign and Security Policy matters. See Opinion 2/13 para. 258. 
8 Comm’n v. Ireland (MOX Plant), CJEU Case C-459/03, 2006 E.C.R. I-04635 [hereinafter MOX Plant]. 
9 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
11 Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 13 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 273. 
12 Id. 
13 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 344, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. 
(C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
14 Opinion 2/13 at para. 202; MOX Plant at para. 169. 
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it may be understood as a manifestation of the principle that the EU is an autonomous 
legal system—which the CJEU sees as being among its core task to protect.
15
 Similar 
provisions are also found in other international agreements, for example in ECHR 
article 55. 
 
Whether an international agreement is incompatible with the constituent treaties because 
it threatens the autonomy of the EU legal system has been a recurring issue in CJEU case-
law over the years.
16
 While TFEU Article 344 is often mentioned in passing in the Court’s 
autonomy jurisprudence,
17
 it is rarely discussed at length. Opinion 2/13 is thus one of the 
few cases in which the CJEU actually engages with TFEU Article 344, using 
fourteen paragraphs of its decision to interpret and apply it.
18
 A prior exception to this 
trend of non-engagement is the grand chamber judgment in MOX Plant—the leading case 
on TFEU Article 344 before Opinion 2/13. 
 
MOX Plant concerned a long-standing dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom 
regarding the commissioning of a mixed oxide (MOX) plant at Sellafield, on the British 
coast of the Irish Sea.
19
 The plant was designed to convert spent nuclear fuel into MOX, 
which can be used as fuel in light water nuclear reactors.
20
 Because the United Kingdom 
did not have any nuclear reactors using MOX fuel at the time, the fuel was intended for 
export through the Irish Sea.
21
 Ireland objected to the construction of the plant on several 
                                            
15 Opinion 2/13 at para. 201; see also the cases mentioned infra note 16. 
16 Notable examples include: Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the Draft Agreement Establishing a European 
Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, CJEU Case C-1/76, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Opinion Pursuant to Article 
228(1) of the Draft Agreement Between the Community and the Countries of the European Free Trade 
Association Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area (I), CJEU Case C-1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-06079; 
Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the Draft Agreement Between the Community and the Countries of the 
European Free Trade Association Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area (II), CJEU Case C-1/92 
1992 E.C.R I-02821; Opinion Pursuant to Article 300(6) of the Proposed Agreement Between the European 
Community and Non-Member States on the Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, CJEU Case C-
1/00, 2002 E.C.R. I-03493; Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU Draft Agreement, Creation of a Unified 
Patent Litigation System, CJEU Case C-1/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-01137. 
17 See, e.g., Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the Draft Agreement Between the Community and the Countries 
of the European Free Trade Association Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area (I), CJEU Case C-
1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-06079, para. 85; Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU Draft Agreement, Creation of a 
Unified Patent Litigation System, CJEU Case C-1/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-01137, para. 63. 
18 Opinion 2/13 at paras. 201–14. 
19 Nico Schrijver, The MOX Plant Case – A Litigation Saga Without a Pronouncement on the Merits, in THE MOX 
PLANT CASE (IRELAND V. UNITED KINGDOM): RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 2001-2008 1–18, 2 (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ed., 2010).  
20 Id.; MOX Plant at para. 21. 
21 Schrijver, supra note 19, at 2. 
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occasions in the mid-to-late 1990s, claiming inter alia that the United Kingdom had failed 
to properly address the Plant’s environmental consequences in the planning stages, and 
that the plant lacked economic justification as required under Union law.
22
 In 2001, when 
the plant was about to become operational, Ireland initiated proceedings against the 
United Kingdom under both the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention)
23
 and the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
24
 
 
Because the UNCLOS is a so-called mixed agreement, to which both the Union itself and its 
member states are parties, the European Commission requested that Ireland provide 
documentation concerning the dispute—including its pleadings in the UNCLOS 
arbitration.
25
 Then, having found that Ireland had failed to respect the CJEU’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, the Commission brought an action against Ireland before the CJEU.
26
 The CJEU 
concluded that Ireland had failed to fulfill its obligations under what is now TFEU 
Article 344 by instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom under the UNCLOS 
Part XV.
27
 
 
Viewing Opinion 2/13 in the light of MOX Plant is revealing because both cases concern 
mixed agreements with provisions on inter-party dispute resolution that have very similar 
features. Given the similarities, one would expect the CJEU to have employed conforming 
reasoning. However, as I will demonstrate below, the reasoning in the two cases cannot be 
reconciled. To show this as clearly as possible I will analyze how the CJEU interpreted and 
applied TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and distinguish this interpretation from the 
approach taken in MOX Plant. 
 
C. Comparing the CJEU’s Approach to TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and MOX Plant 
 
In the relevant part of Opinion 2/13,
28
 the CJEU first points out that “an international 
agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, 
the autonomy of the EU legal system,” and that this principle “is notably enshrined in” 
                                            
22 Id. at 2–3; MOX Plant at paras. 30–48. 
23 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
1069. 
24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
25 Schrijver, supra note 19, at 10; MOX Plant at paras. 53–54. 
26 MOX Plant at paras. 55–57. 
27 Id. at para. 184. 
28 Opinion 2/13 at paras. 201–14. 
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TFEU Article 344.
29
 In doing so, it refers inter alia to the MOX Plant case.
30
 Second, the 
Court notes that it is precisely because of that case law Article 3 of Protocol (No. 8) was 
drafted so as to expressly provide that the Accession Agreement must not affect TFEU 
Article 344.
31
 The Court then explains that the ECHR would form an integral part of Union 
law following accession, and, consequently, the CJEU would have exclusive jurisdiction 
over any dispute between member states—or between one or more member states and 
the Union itself—regarding compliance with the ECHR. At this point, Opinion 2/13 seems to 
be well in line with MOX Plant and the text of Protocol (No. 8).
32
 
 
The CJEU then goes on to apply this interpretation of TFEU Article 344 to the Accession 
Agreement, contrasting the Accession Agreement with the UNCLOS: 
 
Unlike the international convention at issue in the case 
giving rise to the judgment in [MOX Plant paras. 124–
125], which expressly provided that the system for the 
resolution of disputes set out in EU law must in principle 
take precedence over that established by that 
convention, the procedure for the resolution of 
disputes provided for in Article 33 of the ECHR could 
apply to any Contracting Party and, therefore, also to 
disputes between the Member States, or between 
those Member States and the EU, even though it is EU 
law that is in issue.
33
 
 
It is true—and not disputed—that ECHR article 33 makes it possible for EU member states 
to launch inter-party complaints against each other, or the Union itself, before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). But is the italicized language, restating MOX 
Plant and distinguishing it from the case at hand, really accurate? Let us look at the two 
paragraphs in MOX Plant that the Court cites in support of its distinction: 
 
It should be stated at the outset that the [UNCLOS] 
precisely makes it possible to avoid such a breach of 
the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in such a way as to 
preserve the autonomy of the Community legal system. 
                                            
29 Id. at para. 201. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at para. 203. 
32 MOX Plant at para. 123. 
33 Opinion 2/13 at para. 205 (emphasis added). 
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It follows from Article 282 of the [UNCLOS] that, as it 
provides for procedures resulting in binding decisions 
in respect of the resolution of disputes between 
Member States, the system for the resolution of 
disputes set out in the EC Treaty must in principle take 
precedence over that contained in Part XV of the 
[UNCLOS].
34
 
 
The CJEU’s restatement of these two paragraphs in Opinion 2/13 underplays the fact that 
in MOX Plant it was considered sufficient that UNCLOS article 282 merely “makes it 
possible” to avoid a breach of the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction.
35
 That is the threshold for 
compliance with TFEU Article 344: Possibility of member state compliance. After all, as 
pointed out in MOX Plant, “it is between two Member States in regard to an alleged failure 
to comply with Community-law obligations resulting from” TFEU Article 344.
36
 The 
provision is directed at the member states, instructing them what to do when faced with 
different possibilities as to where to file a dispute that concerns Union law. The fact that 
UNCLOS Article 282 goes even a bit further, providing that the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of the Union shall take precedence over those contained in Part XV the 
UNCLOS, was not a decisive factor in MOX Plant.
37
 The CJEU should therefore only rely on 
TFEU Article 344 to block agreements that would establish a conflicting obligation of 
exclusive jurisdiction.
38
  
 
In Opinion 2/13 the CJEU engages in a surprising reinterpretation of MOX Plant. There is no 
ambiguity in the new and stricter threshold. After describing that the accession to the 
ECHR would allow for the possibility of EU member states filing complaints against each 
                                            
34 MOX Plant at paras. 124–25 (emphasis added). 
35 Repeated by the CJEU in MOX Plant at para. 132. 
36 MOX Plant at para. 128. 
37 It might even be argued that neither UNCLOS Article 282 fulfills this requirement, as the final subclause of that 
article provides that forms of dispute resolution other than those laid down in its Part XV shall be used only 
“unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.” It is thus possible for two member states to together submit a 
case concerning both Union law and the UNCLOS to a dispute resolution mechanism established under UNCLOS 
Part XV. This would of course entail a breach of Union law, notably TFEU Article 344 and TEU article 4(3), but that 
would not preclude the jurisdiction of the chosen Part XV dispute resolution mechanism. 
38 Following accession there would potentially be such a conflict between ECHR Article 55 and TFEU Article 344. 
However, this conflict is solved by Article 5 of the Accession Agreement, supra, note 3, which vacates the 
obligation under ECHR Article 55. It provides that proceedings before the CJEU “shall be understood as 
constituting neither procedures of international investigation or settlement within the meaning of Article 35, 
paragraph 2.b of the [ECHR], nor means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Article 55 of the [ECHR].” 
See also Opinion 2/13 at paras. 206–07. 
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other, or the Union itself, it unequivocally states that “[t]he very existence of such a 
possibility undermines the requirement set out in Article 344 TFEU.”
39
 Furthermore: 
 
[T]he fact that Member States or the EU are able to 
submit an application to the ECtHR is liable in itself to 
undermine the objective of Article 344 TFEU and, 
moreover, goes against the very nature of EU law, 
which, . . . requires that relations between the Member 
States be governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU 
law so requires, of any other law.
40
 
 
As to how this alleged incompatibility between TFEU Article 344 and the Accession 
Agreement may be solved, the CJEU insists that “only the express exclusion of the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction under Article 33 of the ECHR over disputes between Member States or 
between Member States and the EU in relation to the application of the ECHR within the 
scope ratione materiae of EU law would be compatible with Article 344 TFEU.”
41
 By 
choosing not to follow an interpretation that would allow for agreements with dispute 
resolution provisions as long as they make it possible for the member states to comply 
with TFEU Article 344, as laid down in MOX Plant, the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 constructs a 
stricter approach, whereby the member states cannot even be given a theoretical 
possibility of breaching TFEU Article 344.
42
 
 
The difference between the two approaches cannot be explained by reference to the 
specific legal situation surrounding the Accession Agreement. Admittedly, in the operative 
part of Opinion 2/13 the CJEU does not explicitly state that the Accession Agreement is 
incompatible with TFEU Article 344. Rather, it states that the Accession Agreement is 
incompatible with TEU Article 6(2) because it is “is liable to affect” TFEU Article 344.
43
 This 
is, however, merely a linguistic nuance caused by the structure of Opinion 2/13. Read in 
context, it is clear that TFEU Article 344 is one of the five separate and independent 
reasons for why the CJEU rejects the Accession Agreement.
44
 Moreover, It would not make 
sense if the savings clause in Article 3 of Protocol (No. 8) to the constituent treaties of the 
                                            
39 Opinion 2/13 at para. 208 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at para. 212. 
41 Id. at para. 213. 
42 This is not only a departure from the CJEU’s earlier case-law, as just demonstrated, but also in clear contrast to 
the views of the General Advocate. See View of Advocate General Kokott at paras. 107–20, Opinion Procedure 
2/13, CJEU Case C-2/13 (June 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. 
43 Opinion 2/13 at para. 258. 
44 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Union
45
—which should be interpreted in light of the Union’s obligation to accede to the 
ECHR under TEU Article 6(2)—imposed a stricter test when assessing the conformity of the 
Accession Agreement with TFEU Article 344 than what would otherwise apply. 
Additionally, considering that only the submission of disputes to methods of settlement 
“other than those provided for therein” is forbidden, one might even argue that, due to 
TEU Article 6(2), submission of disputes to the ECtHR is indirectly provided for in the 
constituent treaties. 
 
If anything, the specific legal circumstances of the Union’s accession to the ECHR seem to 
point towards a less strict application of TFEU Article 344. The fact that the CJEU 
nevertheless used the opportunity in Opinion 2/13 to set stricter limitations leaves us with 
the perception that the Court is reining in the member states—perhaps in an attempt to 
bolster its claim of being the one and only apex court of Europe. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
I. Consequences of the Reinterpretation 
 
There are many mixed agreements that provide for dispute resolution without the 
safeguards that the CJEU now suddenly requires. If the CJEU chooses to follow Opinion 
2/13 in future cases—which one would expect given the fact that it was handed down by 
the full court—many mixed agreements that are already in place must be considered 
incompatible with TFEU Article 344. One example is the OSPAR Convention mentioned 
above.
46
 Other potential examples include the Aarhus Convention,
47
 the Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,
48
 the TIR Convention,
49
 and the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
50
 
                                            
45 See Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 13 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 273. 
46 See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 1069. 
47 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Jun. 25, 1998, 2162 U.N.T.S. 447. Article 16 contains an opt-in clause for compulsory 
dispute resolution, with the choice of either the ICJ or arbitration as the forum. Some EU member states have 
opted in. 
48 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457. Article 21 
contains an opt-in clause for compulsory dispute resolution, with the choice of either the ICJ or arbitration as the 
forum. Some EU member states have opted in. 
49 Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets, Nov. 14, 1975, 1079 
U.N.T.S. 89. Article 57 contains a compulsory arbitration clause, albeit allowing for reservations. Many EU 
member states, though, are parties without reservations as to arbitration. 
50 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. Article 35 
contains a compulsory dispute resolution clause, with the choice of either the ICJ or arbitration as the forum. 
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These consequences were not unknown to the Court. In fact, AG Kokott explicitly warned 
against them in her View: 
 
[I]f the aim in the present case is to lay down an 
express rule on the inadmissibility of inter-State cases 
before the ECtHR and on the precedence of Article 344 
TFEU as a prerequisite for the compatibility of the 
proposed accession agreement with EU primary law, 
this would implicitly mean that numerous international 
agreements which the EU has signed in the past are 
vitiated by a defect, because no such clauses are 
included in them.
51
 
 
Despite the stern warning from the Advocate General, this is exactly what the CJEU has 
done in Opinion 2/13—without even referring to her opposing view. 
 
As for the practical effects of the incompatibility of agreements already in place with TFEU 
Article 344, the conflict would not invalidate those agreements as a matter of public 
international law. Although the decisions of the Union to conclude those agreements 
would be ultra vires, the Union cannot rely on its own law as justification for not fulfilling 
those agreements.
52
 The Union and the member states, though, would be under the 
obligation to terminate those agreements or, if possible, opt out of the conflicting dispute 
resolution mechanisms.
53
 
 
II. How Can Incompatibility with TFEU Article 344 Be Avoided? 
 
For the negotiators that will now attempt to amend the Accession Agreement to 
accommodate Opinion 2/13—provided that this is possible, or even desirable
54
—it should 
                                                                                                                
Reservations against this clause are allowed, but several EU member states are parties without reservation. The 
UNCLOS might also serve as an example. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
51 View of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 42, at para. 117 (emphasis added). 
52 This follows from customary international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15 
art. 46 (Mar. 21, 1986) (not in force). See also European Parliament v. Council and Comm’n (Passenger Name 
Records), CJEU Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-04721, para. 73. 
53 See European Parliament v. Council and Comm’n (Passenger Name Records), CJEU Joined Cases C-317/04 and 
C-318/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-04721, paras. 71–74. 
54 Peers (supra note 5) argues that accession is not desirable under the conditions of Opinion 2/13. Besslink 
suggests that amending the constituent treaties of the Union would be the preferred solution. See Leonard F. M. 
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be relatively simple to avoid incompatibility with TFEU Article 344. The negotiators could 
simply follow the rather clear instruction of the CJEU to exclude intra-EU disputes from the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR.
55
 A paragraph along the following lines could be inserted at the 
end of ECHR Article 33: “Applications by an EU member state, or the European Union, 
alleging a breach of the Convention by another EU member state, or the European Union, 
are inadmissible.” 
 
In addition to being legally trivial, it should be politically possible to get the non-EU parties 
to the ECHR to accept such an amendment. This is because disputes between non-EU 
states and EU member states (or the Union itself) could still be brought before the ECtHR. 
Thus, non-EU member states have little to lose from an intra-EU exclusion. Moreover, 
there is precedence for including so-called “disconnection clauses” in treaties negotiated 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
56
 Such clauses are even more extensive than 
the suggestion above, in that they exclude or limit the application of the entire treaty 
between the EU member states and the Union. 
 
III. Outlook 
 
The reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 is not critical to the process of EU 
accession to the ECHR. However, it is of significance to future negotiations of mixed 
agreements, and of critical and potentially devastating importance for many mixed 
agreements the Union has already concluded. We can only speculate whether the CJEU will 
adjust its approach—and thus reveal that its apparent reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 
in Opinion 2/13 was just a means to reach the Court’s ultimate goal of rejecting the 
Accession Agreement—or if it will confirm the change of course, forcing the Union and its 
member states to adapt. 
                                                                                                                
Besslink, Acceding to the ECHR Notwithstanding the Court of Justice Opinion 2/13, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 23, 
2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/acceding-echr-notwithstanding-court-justice-opinion-213/. 
55 Opinion 2/13 at para. 213. 
56 For an overview of this practice, and a typology of “disconnection clauses”, see Kamala Dawar, Disconnection 
Clauses: An Inevitable Symptom of Regionalism? (Online Proceedings of the Society of International Economic Law 
Working Paper No. 2010/11, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1632433. 
